The mission of Issues in Perspective is to provide thoughtful, historical and biblically-centered perspectives on current ethical and cultural issues.

I have been reading several books dealing with the developments leading up to World War I: Robert Massie’s Nicholas and Alexandra, Chrstopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman and Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace.  There are remarkable similarities to the conditions of the world at the beginning of the 20th century and today.  Is there a gathering storm which could lead the world into another catastrophic world war?  Are the current world leaders “sleepwalking” into another global calamity?

In the summer of 1914 the British foreign secretary, Edward Grey, and many others in positions of power in Britain and across Europe assumed that the latest crisis in the Balkans would be settled, as similar ones were before, by a conference of the great powers. He failed to understand how rapidly Europe was moving to war and to use Britain’s great power to bring the different sides together. World War I changed Europe and the world for good. By 1945, Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and their allies had fought two brutal world wars in the space of three decades. When they created the architecture of the existing global order, they were very clear on what they wanted to prevent. The previous frameworks had failed, and they would create something new that would not. That global order is coming apart.

In a recent and poignant article, historian Margaret MacMillan writes: “When a storm is coming, there will always be signs. The wind might suddenly drop. The tide goes out farther than usual. Streamers of clouds sail across the sky. It’s possible to misread or even ignore these signs—to insist that the drops of rain are just a passing shower—until it’s too late. That’s when the real trouble arrives. What is true of weather is also true of human affairs. Regimes look strong until they don’t. Revolutions at home and upheavals in the international order—the two so often go together—are easy to see in retrospect, but are not always anticipated. Yet if we look closer, we’ll often find the signs were there.”

Whare some of these signs?

• “The Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded 65 state-based conflicts last year—the most since 1946. Great powers find themselves bogged down in asymmetric wars with countries that are making the most of new technologies. Russia’s war in Ukraine, meant to be won in a matter of days, is creaking through its fifth year. Iran, using inexpensive, mass-produced drones to attack American forces and allies, has gained control, perhaps permanently, over a crucial corridor of world trade, drastically reduced U.S. missile stocks and mired President Trump in a war of his own choice.”
• “The world order that held together for most of our lives started to erode when those within it got too comfortable and complacent and when there was too much acceptance—even approval—of bad behavior. We have arrived in a new age of disorder. We must prepare ourselves, beginning with being honest about the seriousness of the moment we’re in and accepting that our fragile system is faltering. That countries are already adjusting, for better and worse. And that any future of cooperation will have to look different.”
• “International order has always depended on the support of great powers and on the cooperation and buy-in of sufficient smaller powers. At the end of the Cold War, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States seemed ready to continue as the guarantor of the post-1945 system. Under Mr. Trump, that’s no longer the case . . . But what if we are already in the early stages of what will be a protracted period of disorder? A world in which we cannot assume that what was true yesterday will be true tomorrow or that seemingly solid institutions will endure. We might cease to be surprised at what the news brings each day . . . Dependable alliances such as NATO are being tested and retested and could fall apart. Russia’s hybrid war with Europe is expanding; China and the United States could clash over Taiwan; competition for resources in a warming, drier world is already stimulating violence. This is a world of increasing unpredictability in which we are left, to a much greater extent than we expected, at the whims of our leaders, who are less bound by external frameworks and feel freer to make it up as they go along.”

Bret Stephens summarizes several additional concerns that point to a potential gathering storm:

• “As in the 1930s and ’40s, the spheres of conflict have multiplied and are merging. Russia’s battlefield reversals seem to have done nothing to diminish Putin’s appetite for risk as he expands his campaign, in barely concealed attacks and threats, against Moldova, Poland and Germany, among other states, while his political allies repeatedly call for direct strikes on Europe and the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Hamas’s assault on Israel in 2023 became, in stages, a war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran; then a war between Iran, the United States and the Gulf states. More recently, Ukraine has directed long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea to disrupt Iranian military supplies  to Russia. And decisions in one theater directly affect outcomes in the other: The expenditure of missile interceptors in the Middle East means that few can now be spared for Ukraine.”
• “The axis of authoritarians has become a fully operational military alliance. Russia is providing North Korea with help to modernize its armed forces, while the North has returned the favor by sending millions of artillery rounds and is now reportedly prepared to send thousands of additional troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine. China supplies Russia with most of the electronic components used in its drones and other military hardware. Russia has given Iran critical targeting intelligence to strike U.S. bases and ships in the Middle East. In the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Beijing could call in its chips with Moscow by engaging the aid of Russia’s powerful Pacific submarine fleet, as detailed in a new paper from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.”
• “The West is a mess. President Trump complains of our allies’ weakness. The allies complain of Trump’s bullying, capriciousness, callowness, mendacity and incompetence. Both sides are right. The latest U.S. tariff salvo on Canada is a case in point: politically ill advised, economically self-defeating, strategically enervating . . . [Furthermore], the war against Iran revealed not just the munitions shortages, which helped bring the war to a premature close, but also America’s acute sensitivity to military fatalities and economic pain, which gave Iran’s leaders an asymmetric advantage given their own tolerance for human suffering. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that even the most sophisticated U.S. military kit is entering obsolescence, thanks to the advent of A.I.-assisted drone warfare. Yet Pete Hegseth . . . decided to phase out an Army drone unit, seemingly because it was championed by generals he didn’t like. The travails of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln during the carrier’s long deployment are a national scandal. But they should call attention to the historically small size of the fleet, and a depleted industrial base that struggles to build and maintain ships. “
• “We may be near the economic brink. One great difference between the 1930s and the present is that, unlike then, we are not in the midst of a worldwide depression. But the warning signs of a sharp and abrupt downturn are everywhere. What happens if or when the A.I. boom starts to run out of steam, much as the dot-com  boom did at the beginning of the century? Or if the currency crisis  in Japan causes it to start selling off its U.S. Treasury bonds? Stanley Druckenmiller, the legendary investor, recently warned in The Wall Street Journal that the Treasury Department’s bond buybacks were all but destined to fail: Ultimately, the price of a $40 trillion national debt will be felt in sharply higher interest rates and the risks they pose to every sector of the economy that’s depended for too long on cheap credit. A deep U.S. recession, or a global financial panic, will inevitably worsen every trend mentioned above. In periods of economic distress, democracies almost always become more risk-averse, while dictatorships become risk-prone. That’s a pattern of history worth recalling as we continue to drift, only dimly aware, toward the gathering storm.”

Two concluding thoughts:

1. Yaroslav Trofimov provides a helpful historical perspective on the demise of the post-1945 world order:  “America’s 80-year run as the world’s strongest power, a relatively benevolent hegemon that attracted willing partners and allies, has been rooted in two major U.S. initiatives launched in response to the upheaval of World War II.  One was to convene the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, which enshrined the idea of free trade and low tariffs, generating unprecedented prosperity for the West. The other, five years later, was to lead the establishment of NATO, an alliance that won the Cold War and has ensured peace in Europe . . . Both of these legacies are being undone with stunning speed by President Trump. His second administration has targeted America’s closest allies with punitive tariffs, has ordered an abrupt stop to military assistance for Ukraine, has frozen foreign aid—and is raising the prospect of a geopolitical realignment toward authoritarian Russia.”
2. Because of the looming threat of a “gathering storm,” the US needs to be reminded of important lessons from the Cold War.  Indeed, Niall Ferguson and Condoleezza Rice, both of Stanford’s Hoover Institution, argue that there are four lessons to be learned:

• Allies matter: The alliance of Russia and China is somewhat fragile because of the war in Ukraine.  But the alliances of interest to the US appear stronger.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revitalized NATO, which is stronger than it has been in decades.  Furthermore, China’s aggressive behavior in Asia has strengthened the ties of the Philippines and Japan to the US.  But these alliances must be continually cultivated and strengthened.
• Deterrence is more important than ever.  “China has been improving every aspect of its military capability, just as the war in Ukraine and wargamming about Taiwan have revealed weaknesses in the West’s.  The West must respond by procuring more advanced weaponry, developing secure supply chains for critical materials and components, and rebuilding the defense-industrial base.  Peace through strength works.”
• It is important to do everything to avoid accidental war. The lesson of August 1914 is that leaders can engage in actions that have unintended consequences.  Leaders can “sleepwalk” the world into war. Discussion, meaningful dialogue and substantive warning systems can guard against accidents that lead to larger conflicts.
• Nothing is inevitable. America must work hard to preserve its democratic institutions; its system of checks and balances; and its role as the champion of democratic values in a world challenging these.  Russia and China believe that democracy is a failure and only authoritarian regimes will be the wave of the future.  That is not inevitable, but just as Russia and China have severe contradictions in their respective regimes, so does the US. We are a polarized, fractured nation—and that is dangerous for the stability of the world.

See Margaret MacMillen in the New York Times (27 September 2026); Bret Stephens in the New York Times (30 August 2026); David French in the New York Times (4 August 2026); Yaroslav Trofimov in the Wall Street Journal (8-9 March 2025); and The Economist (7 September 2023).